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Rates of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) among babies born 
in hospitals in developing countries are 3 - 20 times higher than 
among those born in resource-rich countries.[1] While poor infection 
prevention and control (IPC) practices are most proximally associated 
with transmission of HAIs and high infection rates, contributing 
factors include ageing hospital infrastructure, overcrowded neonatal 
units, inappropriate use of antimicrobial agents and inadequate 
institutional support for IPC and antimicrobial stewardship 
programmes.[2]
Klebsiella pneumoniae is a common pathogen causing invasive HAIs 
in neonates.[1] Factors that predispose neonates to K. pneumoniae 
infection include prematurity and low birth weight.[3] The emergence 
of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae in neonatal units has 
rendered recommended first-line empirical regimens for neonatal 
sepsis ineffective.[4] OXA-48-producing K. pneumoniae strains, which 
may remain phenotypically susceptible to carbapenems, can be 
missed in routine laboratories if not confirmed with molecular 
testing.[5]
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Background. Rates of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) among babies born in developing countries are higher than among those 
born in resource-rich countries, as a result of suboptimal infection prevention and control (IPC) practices. Following two reported deaths 
of neonates with carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae bloodstream infections (BSIs), we conducted an outbreak investigation in a 
neonatal unit of a regional hospital in Gauteng Province, South Africa.
Objectives. To confirm an outbreak of K. pneumoniae BSIs and assess the IPC programme in the neonatal unit.
Methods. We calculated total and organism-specific BSI incidence risks for culture-confirmed cases in the neonatal unit for baseline 
and outbreak periods. We conducted a clinical record review for a subset of cases with K. pneumoniae BSI that had been reported to 
the investigating team by the neonatal unit. An IPC audit was performed in different areas of the neonatal unit. We confirmed species 
identification and antimicrobial susceptibility, and used polymerase chain reaction for confirmation of carbapenemase genes and pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) for typing of submitted clinical isolates.
Results. From January 2017 to August 2018, 5 262 blood cultures were submitted, of which 11% (560/5 262) were positive. Of 560 positive 
blood cultures, 52% (n=292) were positive for pathogenic organisms associated with healthcare-associated BSIs. K. pneumoniae comprised 
the largest proportion of these cases (32%; 93/292). The total incidence risk of healthcare-associated BSI for the baseline period (January 
2017 - March 2018) was 6.8 cases per 100 admissions, and that for the outbreak period (April - September 2018) was 10.1 cases per 
100 admissions. The incidence risk of K. pneumoniae BSI for the baseline period was 1.6 cases per 100 admissions, compared with 5.0 cases 
per 100 admissions during the outbreak period. Average bed occupancy for the entire period was 118% (range 101 - 133%), that for the 
baseline period was 117%, and that for the outbreak period was 121%. In a subset of 12 neonates with K. pneumoniae bacteraemia, the 
median (interquartile range (IQR)) gestational age at birth was 27 (26 - 29) weeks, and the median (IQR) birth weight was 1 100 (880 - 
1 425) g. Twelve bloodstream and 31 colonising K. pneumoniae isolates were OXA-48-positive. All isolates were genetically related by PFGE 
analysis (89% similarity). Inadequate IPC practices were noted, including suboptimal adherence to aseptic technique and hand hygiene 
(57% overall score in the neonatal intensive care unit), with poor monitoring and reporting of antimicrobial use (pharmacy score 55%).
Conclusions. Overcrowding and inadequate IPC and antimicrobial stewardship contributed to a large outbreak of BSIs caused by genetically 
related carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae isolates in the neonatal unit.
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Adequate surveillance and response systems are necessary 
components in preventing the excess morbidity and mortality 
associated with HAIs.[4] However, hospital outbreak investigations 
are complex owing to a multitude of factors influencing transmission 
of pathogens.[6] Investigations are often compromised because 
hospitals lack capacity and responsible personnel lack technical 
skills.[7] Outbreaks can be prevented or terminated early through 
partnership between technical experts and hospital management. [7,8] 
For example, collaborative involvement of staff members in the 
development and implementation of targeted IPC interventions 
improved the effectiveness of an intervention in a prolonged outbreak 
of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae 
in a university hospital intensive care unit (ICU) in France.[8]
In August 2018, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases 
(NICD) was alerted through a media report of two deaths associated 
with K. pneumoniae bloodstream infection (BSI) in the neonatal 
unit of a regional hospital in Gauteng Province, South Africa 
(SA). Following a preliminary assessment of culture-confirmed 
cases of BSI from the unit, the NICD initiated an investigation, in 
collaboration with the Gauteng Provincial Department of Health 
and the health facility. The objectives of the investigation were 
to confirm an outbreak of K. pneumoniae infection and to assess 
the IPC programme implementation in the hospital. In addition, 
prospective microbiological testing and analysis of clinical isolates 
were performed.
Methods
Setting
The regional hospital where this investigation was conducted provides 
both inpatient and outpatient services and has a capacity of 821 beds, 
61 of which are allocated for neonates. The neonatal unit has 16 beds 
for babies weighing <2 500 g, 4 beds in both the ICU and the high-
care unit, 2 isolation rooms with 1 bed each, 8 beds for kangaroo 
mother care and 27 beds for stable neonates weighing >2 500 g. The 
hospital receives referrals from midwife obstetric units in the district, 
from a local district hospital and from private health facilities.
Investigation
A four-tiered approach was used for this multisectoral collaborative 
investigation, with the investigating team comprising representatives 
from the NICD, the National Health Laboratory Service (NHLS) 
Infection Control Service Laboratory (ICSL), the Gauteng provincial 
IPC unit and the hospital. A case was defined as any infant admitted 
to the neonatal unit with any of the following bacterial or fungal 
pathogens isolated from blood culture: pathogens from the ESKAPE 
group (Enterococcus faecium, Staphylococcus aureus, K. pneumoniae, 
Acinetobacter baumannii, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Enterobacter 
spp.), and other organisms considered to be associated with the 
healthcare environment (Escherichia coli, Stenotrophomonas 
maltophilia, Serratia marcescens and Candida spp.). We were unable 
to classify the cases into those with early- or late-onset sepsis because 
admission dates were not provided.
In order to confirm an outbreak of K. pneumoniae bacteraemia, 
baseline rates of K. pneumoniae BSI and other BSI were calculated 
using retrospectively collected laboratory data for the period 
1 January 2017 through to 31 August 2018. These data were obtained 
at the time of the investigation from the NICD/NHLS data warehouse 
that archives NHLS laboratory test information. Corresponding 
denominator data including admissions, patient-days and number 
of neonatal deaths (all causes) by month were requested from the 
hospital. Isolates were not available to confirm carbapenem resistance 
for the vast majority of these retrospectively identified cases, so we 
only report overall rates for K. pneumoniae bacteraemia.
A clinical record review was then conducted for a subset of cases 
with K. pneumoniae bacteraemia using a structured case investigation 
form that included demographic, clinical risk factor and outcome 
variables. This subset was limited to cases that had been reported to 
the NICD by the neonatal unit for the period 1 August 2018 through 
to 13 September 2018.
An IPC audit was performed using the National Department of 
Health’s standardised infection control assessment tool.[9] Nine of 
the 22 available modules in the tool were chosen according to their 
relevance to complete a targeted, problem-focused assessment. This 
included an assessment of IPC practices in the neonatal unit and 
the hospital’s IPC programme. The following modules were used: 
(i) infection control programme; (ii) pharmacy; (iii) ICUs; (iv) hand 
hygiene; (v) intravenous fluids and medication; (vi) urinary catheters; 
(vii) intravenous catheters; (viii) facility check list: alcohol hand 
antiseptic; and (ix) facility check list: hand-washing supplies. The 
investigating team administered module questionnaires to selected 
staff members of the hospital. Each module was scored by adding the 
total number of points for responses. The overall quality of practices 
measured was translated into three categories: A = recommended 
practices are followed consistently and thoroughly (>75% of possible 
points); B = recommended practices usually followed (50 - 75% 
of possible points); and C = training and follow-up needed on 
recommended practices (<50% of possible points). In addition, an 
assessment of hand hygiene practices was done by direct observation 
using a World Health Organization (WHO) tool.[10] Staff in the 
neonatal unit were observed on one occasion on 5 September 2018. 
The session lasted 20 - 30 minutes. Hand hygiene opportunities 
included five indications: (i) before touching a patient; (ii) before 
clean/aseptic procedure; (iii) after body fluid exposure risk; (iv) after 
touching a patient; and (v) after touching a patient’s surroundings. 
Adherence was calculated by dividing the total number of hand 
hygiene actions by the total number of opportunities. A missed 
opportunity was defined as no hand hygiene action being performed 
when indicated. Investigators were trained to use the audit tools.
Finally, laboratory investigations were conducted at three 
sites. Initial diagnostic testing was performed at the local NHLS 
microbiology laboratory following standard operating procedures for 
bacterial culture and identification and antimicrobial susceptibility 
testing. Blood cultures that yielded growth of K. pneumoniae were 
referred to the NHLS ICSL, where carbapenem minimum inhibitory 
concentrations (MICs) were determined by Etest (bioMérieux, 
France), and a modified Hodge test and imipenem v. imipenem + 
ethylenediaminetetra-acetic acid (EDTA) disc diffusion tests were 
performed. Suspected carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae 
isolates were referred to the NICD. Rectal swab colonisation surveys 
were conducted by the hospital IPC staff at different time points from 
July 2018 through to September 2018, and swabs were sent to the 
NICD for processing. Swabs were inoculated on MacConkey agar, 
and the inoculum was streaked out for single colonies and incubated 
aerobically at 35oC for 24 hours. Isolates were identified using a matrix-
assisted laser desorption/ionisation time-of-flight mass spectrometer 
(MALDI-TOF MS) instrument (Bruker, USA). Colonies identified 
as K.  pneumoniae were subcultured and incubated for 24 hours. 
The antimicrobial susceptibility profiles were determined with the 
Microscan Walkaway System (NM44, Beckman Coulter, USA) and 
results were interpreted using a Clinical and Laboratory Standards 
Institute (CLSI) guideline.[11] Colistin MIC results were interpreted 
using a European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing 
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(EUCAST) guideline.[12] A subset of K. pneumoniae isolates (12 from 
cases of bacteraemia that had been reported to the NICD by the 
neonatal unit for the period 1 August 2018 through to 13 September 
2018, and 31 from the rectal swab colonisation surveys) underwent 
molecular testing for the presence of carbapenemase genes (blaVIM, 
blaNDM, blaOXA-48 and variants, blaKPC, blaGES and blaIMP) and molecular 
strain typing using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.[13-15] In addition, 
four historical K.  pneumoniae isolates that had been submitted by 
the same hospital to the NICD during the baseline period were also 
included for comparison.
Data were manipulated and analysed in Excel 2010 (Microsoft, 
USA) and Stata 13 (StataCorp, USA), respectively.
The University of the Witwatersrand Human Research Ethics 
Committee approved the urgent outbreak investigation (ref. no. 
M160667) and the hospital granted written permission to conduct 
the outbreak investigation (ref. no. 23/08/2016).
Results
Baseline rates of BSI
From 1 January 2017 through to 31 August 2018, 5 262 blood 
cul tures were submitted by the neonatal unit. A bacterial or fungal 
organism was cultured from 11% of specimens (560/5 262). Of 
the 560 positive blood cultures, 292 (52%) yielded pathogens 
from the ESKAPE group or organisms that are associated with 
healthcare-associated BSIs (as per the case definition). The other 268 
organisms included Klebsiella spp. other than K. pneumoniae, Listeria 
monocytogenes, non-typhoidal Salmonella spp., Shigella spp. and 
Streptococcus spp. Among the 292 positive blood culture specimens, 
K.  pneumoniae was the most common pathogen (32%; 93/292), 
followed by A. baumannii (19%; 56/292) and S. aureus (13%; 37/292) 
(Fig. 1). Forty-seven cases of K. pneumoniae BSI occurred during the 
baseline period (1  January 2017 - 31 March 2018), with a median 
(interquartile range (IQR)) of 2 (1 - 5) cases per month. A clear 
increase in the number of cases of K. pneumoniae occurred during 
the outbreak period (1  April 2018 - 13 September 2018; n=51) 
compared with the baseline period, despite the number of admissions 
remaining stable (Fig. 2). From 1 January 2017 to 31 August 2018, 
there were 3 836 neonatal admissions. The overall incidence risk of 
healthcare-associated BSI for the entire period was 7.6 cases per 100 
admissions. The incidence risk of healthcare-associated BSI for the 
baseline period was 6.8 cases per 100 admissions, and that for the 
outbreak period was 10.1 cases per 100 admissions (incidence risk 
ratio 1.5) (Table 1). The overall incidence risk of K. pneumoniae BSI 
was 2.4 cases per 100 admissions; the incidence risk was 1.6 cases 
per 100 admissions during the baseline period, and 5.0 cases per 
100 admissions during the outbreak period (incidence risk ratio 3.1) 
(Table 2). During August 2018, the number of neonates admitted 
to the 61-bed unit ranged from 72 to 90 per day, with a total of 217 
admissions for that month. The average bed occupancy for the entire 
period was 118%, ranging from 101% in March 2018 to a peak of 
133% in August 2018. Average bed occupancy for the baseline period 
was 117%, and that for the outbreak period was 121% (Table 1).
Clinical record review
Of the 51 culture-confirmed cases of K. pneumoniae bacteraemia 
identified in the neonatal unit from 1 April 2018 to 13 September 
2018, only 24% (n=12) were reported in a line list to the investigating 
team by 13 September 2018. These 12 neonates had K. pneumoniae 
bacteraemia caused by strains that were resistant to carbapenems 
and had been diagnosed from 1 July 2018 to 13 September 2018. For 
these 12 neonates, the median (IQR) gestational age at birth was 27 
(26 - 29) weeks and the median (IQR) birth weight was 1 100 (880 - 
1 425) g. Females accounted for 6 of the cases, and 4 neonates were 
born to mothers who were known to be HIV-seropositive. By the end 
of the investigation period, 6 neonates had been discharged and the 
remaining 6 had died. All but one were admitted into the neonatal 
unit on the day of birth. Reasons for admission included low birth 
weight, respiratory distress (80%), hyaline membrane disease (20%), 
necrotising enterocolitis (20%), neonatal sepsis (20%) and neonatal 
jaundice (10%). The median (IQR) age of the 12 neonates at the time 
of the first blood culture was 3 (1 - 10) days. The majority of neonates 
had at least one invasive medical device in situ during the course 
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Fig. 1. Number of positive blood cultures of Klebsiella pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumannii and Staphylococcus aureus, and number of admissions in the 
neonatal unit of the regional hospital, January 2017 through to August 2018.
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of their admission, including peripheral intravenous lines, central 
venous catheters, umbilical catheters and endotracheal tubes.
IPC audit
The overall score for availability of an IPC programme in the hospital 
was 98% (Table 3). The health facility had two trained IPC personnel 
who requested external assistance to investigate the outbreak. The 
observed adherence to hand hygiene practices during a single IPC 
audit on 5 September 2018 was 77% (49/64). The audit detected 
gaps in practice related to aseptic technique and an unacceptably 
low overall score of 57% in the neonatal ICU (Table 3). The overall 
pharmacy score was 55%; areas of weakness in the pharmacy module 
included the antibiotic control programme (score of 35%) and 
monitoring and reporting of antibiotic use (score of 13%) (Table 3).
Laboratory investigations
Fifteen bloodstream isolates were cultured from 12 (of 51) cases 
from the outbreak period. Only 12 of these 15 isolates were available 
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Fig. 2. Epidemic curve of Klebsiella pneumoniae bacteraemia by date of specimen collection, 1 April 2018 through to 13 September 2018 (n=51). (BSI = 
bloodstream infection.)
Table 1. Neonatal unit statistics, proportion of positive blood cultures, and incidence risk of BSI in the neonatal unit of the regional 
hospital, January 2017 through to August 2018
Year Month Admissions, n Patient-days, n Bed occupancy, %
Positivity for all 
blood cultures, %
Incidence risk of BSI, 
cases per 100 admissions
2017 Jan 185 2 048 108 7 8.1
Feb 193 1 905 112 10 6.2
Mar 204 2 164 114 7 5.4
Apr 222 2 431 133 10 7.7
May 263 2 480 131 11 5.3
Jun 198 2 285 125 12 10.1
Jul 217 2 306 122 12 7.4
Aug 181 1 924 102 9 8.3
Sep 206 2 161 118 5 3.9
Oct 183 2 201 116 13 8.2
Nov 205 2 262 124 8 5.9
Dec 178 2 357 125 11 6.2
2018 Jan 164 2 089 110 15 9.1
Feb 167 2 006 117 14 5.4
Mar 148 1 909 101 14 6.1
Apr 157 2 021 110 14 10.8
May 184 2 102 111 14 9.2
Jun 175 2 380 130 8 7.4
Jul 189 2 288 121 13 12.2
Aug 217 2 514 133 11 10.6
Total 3 836 43 833 118 11 7.6
BSI = bloodstream infection.
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for molecular testing at the NICD. All 12 bloodstream isolates 
were positive for blaOXA-48 and variants. Two of the 3 isolates 
not available for molecular testing were modified Hodge test-
positive. All 12  isolates were susceptible to amikacin, 11 isolates 
were susceptible to tigecycline, and 10 isolates were susceptible 
to colistin, tetracycline and levofloxacin. The 2 colistin-resistant 
isolates were not confirmed with other phenotypic assays. All 
isolates were resistant to amoxicillin-clavulanate, ampicillin/
sulbactam, ampicillin, fosfomycin, pipera cillin/tazobactam and 
piperacillin. Four bloodstream isolates, which had been submitted 
during the baseline period, were positive for blaOXA-48 and variants; 
one isolate harboured both the blaNDM and blaOXA-48 and variants 
genes. Of the 90 rectal swabs submitted by the regional hospital, 31 
cultured K. pneumoniae, all of which were positive for blaOXA-48 and 
variants. Three patients with a positive colonisation swab also had 
K. pneumoniae bacteraemia. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis 
indicated that all isolates were genetically related (89% similarity 
value), except for a single isolate from a case of bacteraemia 
diagnosed on 25 August 2018 (strain ML5598: similarity value 79%) 
(Fig. 3). Colonising and invasive strains from the outbreak period 
were genetically related to the four strains from the baseline period 
(strains ML4343, ML4348, ML4480 and ML4586).
Discussion
There was a three-fold increase in the incidence risk of K. pneumoniae 
bacteraemia during a 5-month outbreak period in 2018 among 
patients admitted to the neonatal unit of a large regional hospital, 
compared with the incidence risk during the preceding 15-month 
baseline period.
Although retrospectively collected laboratory data confirmed 
a large number of cases during the outbreak period, only a small 
subset of cases was reported in a line list at the time of investigation. 
Further interrogation of these data in collaboration with the hospital 
staff pointed to gaps in the surveillance and reporting systems in the 
hospital. As found in a previous study, adequate surveillance and 
response systems are necessary components in preventing HAIs. [4] 
Within the reported subset with clinical data, cases were mostly 
premature neonates with typical risk factors such as low birth 
weight.[3]
K. pneumoniae was the most common pathogen cultured from 
blood cultures during the outbreak, followed by A. baumannii. 
We were only able to confirm that 12 of 51 cases during the 
defined outbreak period were caused by a carbapenem-resistant 
K.  pneumoniae strain; isolates were unavailable for the remaining 
39 cases. Twelve invasive and 31 colonising K. pneumoniae strains, 
which were available for testing, carried a carbapenemase-encoding 
gene (blaOXA-48 and variants) and one isolate had an additional 
blaNDM gene. A systematic review of carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) infections in African countries revealed 
a rapid increase in the number of reports of CPE infections. [16] This 
study also demonstrated that OXA-48 and variants was the most 
commonly reported carbapenemase. [16] Similarly, a study looking 
at K. pneumoniae isolates in private hospitals across north-eastern 
SA found OXA-48 and variants to be most common. [17] A  high 
prevalence of carbapenem-resistance genes including blaOXA-48 
and variants has also been described among multidrug-resistant 
Gram-negative bacteria in Tanzanian tertiary hospitals.[18] Several 
outbreaks and sporadic cases of OXA-48 and variants-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae infections have been reported from European 
neonatal ICUs, most of which were related to patients with previous 
exposure to healthcare facilities in Turkey, the Middle East and 
northern Africa.[19] SA has added CPE to a list of notifiable medical 
Table 2. Neonatal unit statistics, proportion of Klebsiella pneumoniae among all BSIs, and incidence risks/rates of K. pneumoniae 
BSI in the neonatal unit of the regional hospital, January 2017 through to August 2018
Year Month Admissions, n Patient-days, n
Incidence risk of  
K. pneumoniae BSI, cases  
per 100 admissions
Incidence rate of  
K. pneumoniae BSI, cases  
per 1 000 patient-days
Proportion of 
K. pneumoniae 
among all BSIs, %
2017 Jan 185 2 048 2.2 2.0 27
Feb 193 1 905 0.0 0.0 0
Mar 204 2 164 1.0 0.9 18
Apr 222 2 431 2.7 2.5 35
May 263 2 480 0.0 0.0 0
Jun 198 2 285 3.0 2.6 30
Jul 217 2 306 0.5 0.4 6
Aug 181 1 924 2.8 2.6 33
Sep 206 2 161 1.0 0.9 25
Oct 183 2 201 3.3 2.7 40
Nov 205 2 262 2.4 2.2 42
Dec 178 2 357 1.1 0.8 18
2018 Jan 164 2 089 3.0 2.4 33
Feb 167 2 006 1.2 1.0 22
Mar 148 1 909 0.7 0.5 11
Apr 157 2 021 4.5 3.5 41
May 184 2 102 4.3 3.8 47
Jun 175 2 380 4.0 2.9 54
Jul 189 2 288 4.8 3.9 39
Aug 217 2 514 6.9 6.0 65
Total   3 836 43 833 2.4 2.1 32
BSI = bloodstream infection.
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conditions, and laboratories are required to report cases monthly. 
The situation in SA is similar to that in India. In a large cohort 
study conducted among neonates born at three tertiary hospitals 
in India, the incidence of total neonatal sepsis was 14% and that 
of culture-positive sepsis was 6%.[20] The pathogen mix did not 
differ between early-onset and late-onset sepsis, and two-thirds 
of the isolates were Gram-negative bacteria. More than half of 
K. pneumoniae strains were multidrug resistant. In another cohort 
study conducted in a level 3 neonatal unit in India, neonatal sepsis 
accounted for two-thirds of total deaths and bacterial isolates caused 
74% of these infections.[21] K. pneumoniae and A. baumannii were 
the most common bacterial pathogens and were multidrug resistant 
in the vast majority of cases. More than 80% of the isolates were 
carbapenem resistant.
All available K. pneumoniae isolates but one in the outbreak we 
investigated were closely related by molecular typing. The epidemic 
Table 3. Results of the IPC audit in the neonatal unit of the regional hospital, 5 September 2018
Module
Overall score 
(category)* Key areas assessed (score) Notes
(i) IPC programme 98% (A) • Infection control regulations accreditation
• Responsibilities and authority
• Infection control committee
• Key infection control personnel
• Infection control education programmes
• Outbreak investigation and nosocomial 
infection surveillance
This section assessed the broader hospital IPC 
programme. The score indicated/suggested that 
an infection control programme was available 
and functional.
(ii) Pharmacy 55% (B) • Pharmacy key personnel (100%)
• Pharmacy services (84%)
• Antibiotic control programme (35%)
• Antibiotic use monitoring and reporting (13%) 
Recommended practices were followed in some 
but not all areas.
(iii) Neonatal ICU 57% (B) • ICU staffing (50%)
• ICU general practices (50%)
• Mechanical ventilation (50%)
• Prophylaxis and monitoring (67%)
Recommended practices were followed in some 
but not all areas.
(iv) Hand hygiene 
practices (policy)
70% (B) • Policies on hand hygiene practices in the 
clinical area of the neonatal unit
There was no policy on covering skin lesions and 
cuts with waterproof dressing. The hand hygiene 
policy specified keeping fingernails short and/or 
not using artificial nails or nail extensions.
(v) Intravenous fluids 
and medication
61% (B) • Preparation of intravenous fluids and 
medications in the neonatal unit
There was no designated room for preparing 
medicines. Samples of multi-use medicine vials 
were not collected and submitted to a laboratory 
for testing as part of this audit.
(vi) Urinary catheters 66% (B) • Types of urinary catheters used (100%)
• Procedures for use of indwelling urinary 
catheters (47%)
• Procedures for insertion and maintenance of 
urinary catheters (90%)
Areas for improvement included ensuring a 
regular supply of indwelling urine catheters.
(vii) Intravenous 
catheters 
72% (B) • This section assessed the use and care of 
intravenous catheters in the neonatal unit
Areas for improvement included ensuring the 
availability of appropriate skin antiseptics for the 
insertion of intravenous catheters. 
(viii) Facility check list: 
alcohol hand antiseptic 
89% (A) • Different wards or clinical areas were assessed 
for the presence of alcohol-based hand 
antiseptic using a standardised checklist form
Recommended equipment and supplies for hand 
hygiene practices were generally available but 
not assessed at each point of care. 
(ix) Facility check list: 
hand-washing supplies
89% (A) • Different wards or clinical areas were assessed 
for the presence of hand-washing supplies 
using a standardised checklist form
Recommended equipment and supplies for hand 
hygiene practices were available. 
(x) Hand hygiene 
(observation)
77% (A) • Before touching a patient (83%)
• Before clean/aseptic procedure (80%)
• After body fluid exposure risk (100%)
• After touching a patient (75%)
• After touching patient’s surroundings (64%)
A total of 64 opportunities were observed for 4 
doctors and 10 nurses. Twenty-four hand-washing 
actions and 25 hand-rub actions were performed 
by the 14 healthcare members. A difference was 
observed in the compliance rates between doctors 
(89%; 16/18) and nurses (72%; 33/46).
IPC = infection prevention and control; ICU = intensive care unit.
*A = recommended practices are followed consistently and thoroughly (>75% of possible points); B = recommended practices usually followed (50 - 75% of possible points).
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curve and molecular typing results both suggest a propagated 
outbreak (with person-to-person transmission) of K. pneumoniae 
bacteraemia. The outbreak strains were genetically related to strains 
from the baseline period, suggesting that the same strain had 
persisted in the unit for months and caused a large outbreak from 
April 2018 onwards.
Inadequate support for IPC programmes and inappropriate use of 
antimicrobials are institutional factors contributing to the increase in 
HAIs.[2] Although the score for the availability of an IPC programme 
in the hospital was high, there were gaps in the actual implementation 
of this programme. The overall pharmacy score was 55%, with low 
scores in the antibiotic control programme and in the antibiotic use 
monitoring and reporting modules. Pharmacy has an important 
role in antimicrobial stewardship and oversight.[22] Antimicrobial 
stewardship programmes in hospital settings can improve prescribing 
and infection outcomes.[22] In terms of IPC, the existence of policies 
and guidelines alone is not sufficient to ensure adoption and 
implementation.[23] The WHO recommends ongoing education and 
training of healthcare workers on the policies and guidelines, coupled 
with continuous monitoring of adherence.[23]
Fig. 3. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis banding patterns of 15 (invasive) bloodstream and 31 (colonising) rectal swab Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates from the 
neonatal unit of the regional hospital, 5 October 2017 through to 13 September 2018.
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Study strengths and limitations
This investigation was a multisectoral collaborative effort. Colla-
boration with all relevant stakeholders is a necessity in facilitating 
outbreak investigations, ensuring appropriate facility response and 
follow-through on recommendations.
The investigation had a number of limitations. There was no 
available information on changes in IPC practices between the 
baseline and outbreak periods. We did not obtain information on the 
total number of deaths in the unit and the number of deaths associated 
with K. pneumoniae bacteraemia. Comprehensive patient clinical 
records were unavailable or incomplete. We characterised only a 
small subset of invasive isolates. Routine colonisation survey methods 
were not well documented. We could not calculate colonisation 
prevalence in the unit because swabs were not collected during a 
defined period. The IPC audit was conducted on a single day and 
may not reflect daily practices. The audit also omitted an evaluation 
of the milk kitchen and auxiliary areas, as well as equipment and 
environmental cleaning practices. Multi-use medicine vial practices 
were not documented and no samples of multi-use vials were referred 
for laboratory testing. We did not specifically document the presence 
of alcohol-based hand rub at each point of care. We did not observe 
procedures such as intravenous medicine preparation, line or urinary 
catheter insertion. No environmental testing was conducted.
Recommendations
We recommended actions to reduce the high bed occupancy, 
including closure of the unit to new admissions during the outbreak 
period. Isolation and/or cohorting of infected or colonised patients 
and continued implementation of contact precautions were advised. 
We recommended weekly observations and audits of hand hygiene 
practices, re-training of all unit personnel and the provision of 
appropriate equipment and supplies for hand hygiene and aseptic 
practices. Other recommendations included active surveillance 
of BSIs in the neonatal unit and the institution of a neonatal 
antimicrobial stewardship programme. A repeat IPC audit including 
all auxiliary areas such as the milk kitchen, as well as testing multi-
use vials, was suggested. We also recommended a thorough review 
of environmental and equipment cleaning practices in the unit. 
We did not recommend relocation of critically ill patients to other 
hospitals. Although the number of cases decreased in the aftermath 
of the reported outbreak following implementation of recommended 
interventions, sporadic outbreaks have continued to occur in this unit.
Conclusions
Overcrowding with consequential breaches in IPC practices related 
to hand hygiene and poor aseptic technique contributed to horizontal 
transmission of carbapenemase-producing and genetically related 
K. pneumoniae strains, resulting in an outbreak of BSIs in the 
neonatal unit of this regional hospital. Hospitals should conduct 
active surveillance of neonatal infections and ensure that IPC and 
antimicrobial stewardship programmes are initiated or strengthened.
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